• In two conservative provinces, Mazandaran and Yazd, a turnout of more than 100% was recorded.
• If Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's victory was primarily caused by the increase in voter turnout, one would expect the data to show that the provinces with the greatest increase in voter turnout would also show the greatest 'swing' in support towards Ahmadinejad. This is not the case.
• In a third of all provinces, the official results would require that Ahmadinejad took not only all former conservative voters, all former centrist voters, and all new voters, but also up to 44% of former reformist voters, despite a decade of conflict between these two groups.
• In 2005, as in 2001 and 1997, conservative candidates, and Ahmadinejad in particular, were markedly unpopular in rural areas.
That the countryside always votes conservative is a myth. The claim that this year Ahmadinejad swept the board in more rural provinces flies in the face of these trends.
-UPDATEThese results are not significantly affected by the statement of the Guardian Council that some voters may have voted outside their home district, thus causing the irregularities highlighted by the defeated Mohsen Rezai.
Whilst it is possible for large numbers of voters to cast their ballots outside their home district (one of 366), the proportion of people who would have cast their votes outside their home province is much smaller, as the 30 provinces are too large for effective commuting across borders. In Yazd, for example, where turnout was above 100% at provincial level, there are no significant population centres near provincial boundaries. This makes the lack of a link between the provinces that saw an increase in turnout and those that saw a swing to Ahmadinejad (Fig.1) all the more unusual. There is no significant correlation between the increase in participation for a given province and the swing to Ahmadinejad (Fig.1) . The lack of a direct relationship makes the argument that Ahmadinejad won the election because of an increase in participation by a previously silent conservative majority somewhat problematic.
Irregularities in Voter Turnout
Furthermore, there are concerns about the numbers themselves. Two provinces, Mazandaran and Yazd, have results which indicate that more votes were cast on 12 June than there were eligible voters and that four more provinces had turnouts of around 95%.
In a country where allegations of 'tombstone voting' -the practice of using the identity documents of the deceased to cast additional ballots -are both longstanding and widespread, this result is troubling but perhaps not unexpected. This interpretation is to some extent supported by the relationship between the percentage of former Karrubi voters in a province and its swing to Ahmadinejad (Fig.2) .
To many reformists, this situation is extremely unlikely. Mehdi Karrubi is a well-known reformist, whose views are diametrically opposed to Ahmadinejad's on issues of political and cultural freedoms, economic management, and foreign policy. They allege fraud, and it is likely that the provinces where Karrubi's vote has collapsed will provide the bulk of the 600+ complaints which the defeated candidates are lodging against the conduct of the election. The data offers no arbitration in this dispute, although Boudewijn Roukema's application of statistical fraud detection techniques to the 'by district' data has turned up some anomalies with respect to the figures for Karrubi's vote 4 which may suggest that they were created by a computer. These can be followed up should the fully disaggregated 'by polling station' data be released during the ongoing dispute. (Fig.4 ) and conservatives as a group (Fig.5) . 
Fig.2 If Ahmadinejad's victory was caused primarily by defections from

Fig.4 In 2005, the more 'rural' a province was (according to the
Source: Ministry of Interior Publications 2005 and 2009 and Iranian Census of 2006 (see Appendix)
This data supports the contention of a prominent academic expert on rural The 2009 data suggests a sudden shift in political support with precisely these rural provinces, which had not previously supported Ahmadinejad or any other conservative (Fig.5) , showing substantial swings to Ahmadinejad (Fig.6) 
